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ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF COST SHARING-
AN APPLICATION TO IRRIGATION 
David Aadland and Van Kolpin 
ABSTRACT 
Multiple-cost sharing rules often coexist in seemingly identical environments. We use 
shared irrigation costs as a context for examining the extent to which the structural environment 
explains the selection of a cost sharing rule. We find that environmental factors that-induce 
greater dependence on the cooperation of others, influence majority interests, create difficulties 
for interpersonal utility comparisons, or impact notions of "faimess"-all have impressive 
explanatory power. These results present the first formal empirical analysis of the manner in 
which structural features influence the actual cost-sharing choices of economic agents. 
JEL Classification: C71, D63, C25 
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ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF COST SHARING-
AN APPLICATION TO IRRIGATION l 
Introduction 
The success of cooperative ventures often hinges on the arrangements made to share the costs 
and benefits generated. Examples range from the large scale, such as funding of public projects 
through the taxation of a nation's citizenry, to the small scale, such as allocation of a restaurant's 
tips between its waiters and chef. Allocation mechanisms which are ill-suited for the task at 
hand may induce a "tragedy of the commons" or even create outright conflict. An extensive 
axiomatic literature has emerged that sheds light on such pitfalls and characterizes "optimal" 
allocation procedures. (See Moulin (forthcoming) and Thomson (forthcoming) for a broad 
coverage of the axiomatic approach to cost and resource allocation problems.) Even so, 
mUltiple-sharing mechanisms can often be observed coexisting harmoniously in seemingly 
identical environments. Does such behavior suggest that several sharing mechanisms are equally 
appropriate and the choice of which to adopt is essentially arbitrary? Or do environmental cues 
exist that reliably reveal the sharing mechanism of choice? If such explanatory power can be 
empirically established, does it support or run counter to the central spirit of axioms employed in 
the theoretical cost-sharing literature? 
We use the costs incurred from the upkeep of a shared irrigation ditch as a context for 
examining the questions posed above. As detailed in section 3, our sample of irrigation ditches 
are drawn from Carbon and Stillwater Counties of Montana, USA. These ditches are used 
IThe authors wish to thank Jim Kindle and Marty van Cleave (MT Department of Natural Resources and 
conservation); the survey respondents from Carbon and Stillwater Counties, MT; Stephanie Kuster (MT Secretary of 
State Office); Dan Gustafson (Montana State University); Rick Krannich and Bob Hill (Department of Sociology 
and Department of Irrigation and Water Resources, respectively, Utah State University). 
primarily to irrigate hayfields, although they are occasionally used to irrigate other cash crops, 
water stock animals, and irrigate lawns or gardens. A typical ditch begins at the headgate (a 
device that controls the volume of water diverted from the source stream) and then continues on 
a sequential path through the lands of each agent using this "main" ditch. (See Figure 1.1.) 
Agents (typically ranchers) also have their own private ditches that branch off from the main 
ditch and transport water to their parcels of land. Only the costs associated with the main ditch 
are shared as each agent is individually responsible for expenses incurred on their private 
ditches. The most common expenses on a main ditch include headgate repair, silt and debris 
removal, and replacement of deteriorating ditch banks. 
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Figure I_I 
The data we have compiled from this sample of irrigation ditches provide a compelling 
framework for our study. Indeed, the cost-sharing rules employed on these ditches have 
typically been in place for many decades (often over a century), suggesting that if a rule were ill-
behaved, it would likely have been discarded long ago. We are able to partition all rules in our 
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sample into either the average or serial class. A rule is in the average class if all agents pay 
according to an identical fixed "rate" for use of the irrigation ditch.2 Serial rules apply this same 
principle, though do so in a serial fashion along the ditch. That is, the ditch is partitioned into a 
sequence of segments such that all agents require the first segment to be operational in order to 
receive water, all but the first agent on the ditch additionally require the second segment to be 
operational, ... , all but the ith agent additionally require the i+ 1 segment to be operational, and 
so on and so forth. Each segment is then treated like a separate ditch whose costs are covered by 
having all agents requiring its use pay an identical fixed rate. An agent's total obligation for 
access to the main ditch is thus the sum of its obligations on each of these individual segments. 
(The reader may note that in this context the resulting allocation is identical to that generated by 
the Shapley value, introduced in Shapley (1953), of the corresponding coalitional game.) We 
define the serial class to contain those rules that protect agents from the burden of costs incurred 
downstream from their property. Thus the serial class contains both true serial rules as well as 
"marginal rules" in which agents are individually responsible for maintaining portions of the 
main ditch lying on their property. 
In addition to cost share rule classification, our dataset includes information on the benefits, 
costs, and distributional features associated with the irrigation ditches and the parcels of land 
they service. Our econometric analysis reveals that the selection of a cost share rule is far from 
arbitrary and that a reduced form of the structural environment has impressive explanatory 
power. Loosely speaking, we find that if environmental factors induce greater dependency on 
the cooperation of others, then a rule within the average class becomes more likely. If, on the 
other hand, environmental factors imply less need for cooperation, then an outcome in the serial 
2This "rate" may be defmed on a per capita basis, per irrigated acre basis, or on the basis of shares of stock 
owned in the ditch's controlling interest. Further details are provided in section 2. 
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class becomes more likely. We also find factors that influence majority interests, create 
difficulties for interpersonal utility comparisons, or impact notions of "fairness" to be important 
pieces of the puzzle. These results present the first formal empirical analysis of the manner in 
which structural features influence the actual cost-sharing choices of economic agents. Our 
results also provide direction through uncharted territory in that previous theoretical analyses do 
not always offer a clear view of how structural features should be expected to affect the choice of 
cost allocation. 
We further note that both the average and serial mechanisms have received considerable 
attention in the theoretical literature, a small sample of which includes Friedman and Moulin 
(1999), Koster et al. (1998), and Sprumont (1998). Even the specific context of irrigation cost 
sharing has been highlighted in works such as Aadland and Kolpin (1998) and Moulin (2001). 
These analyses suggest that, depending on one's axiomatic perspective, either mechanism may 
be deemed "optimal." The central axiomatic theme that distinguishes serial mechanisms from 
average mechanisms is the protection of those imposing small demands on the shared resource 
from those imposing large demands. In the context of our sample of shared irrigation ditches, 
the demands an agent places on the system are synonymous with the length of ditch that must be 
maintained to service the agent's needs. Thus agents imposing small demands are located at the 
front of the ditch, while agents imposing large demands are located at the ditch's tail. 
Empirically, we find that serial mechanisms are indeed prone to emerge when the pressure for 
such protection is most keen, indicating that the theoretical literature on the subject is reflective 
of real-world cost-sharing behavior. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows . Section 2 introduces a theoretical model 
that serves to motivate our empirical analysis. We outline the data we have collected and the 
sources from which it was derived in section 3. Section 4 presents our empirical analysis and 
results. Closing comments are found in section 5. 
5 
2. Theoretical Structure 
We first consider a simple representation of shared irrigation costs. In this simple structure 
we assume that a finite number of agents N={I, ... ,n} are ordered sequentially along an irrigation 
ditch from its beginning to its end. Given this ordering, the ditch can be partitioned into a 
sequence of uniquely defined segments. Segment 1 is the portion of ditch from the headgate to 
the last point required to service agent 1, segment 2 is the portion of ditch from the end of 
segment 1 to the last point required to service agent 2, .. . , segment i is the portion of ditch from 
the end of segment i-I to the last point required to service agent i, and so on and so forth. For 
each i=I, ... ,n, let Ci denote the annualized costs affiliated with segment i and let c =(Ci)ieNE9i+N 
denote the vector of all such costs. The pair (c,N) will be referred to as a simple irrigation game. 
Note that the aggregate costs of servicing any coalition S~N can be characterized by 
V(S)=Cl+ ... +Cmax{ieS}, i.e., the aggregate costs on all ditch segments necessary to service the last 
member of S (and thus all of S). A cost allocation for a simple irrigation game is a vector 
X=(Xi)ieN that covers the total cost LCi, i.e., LXi = Ctotal=LCi. (Note that summation limits will be 
omitted when no confusion results.) Examples of cost allocations include: 
average cost sharing: a = (ai)ieN where ai = Ctota/n for each iEN, 
serial cost sharing: s = (Si)ieN where Si = c1/n+ ... +c/(n-i+ 1) for each iEN. 
Average cost sharing simply divides total costs equally between all agents. Serial cost 
sharing divides each segment cost equally between all agents who use the segment. Since agent i 
uses segments 1 through i, agent i' s aggregate cost share under the serial rule is the sum of i' s 
share of the costs Cl through Ci. 
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Real-world applications naturally have much more detail than is provided by simple 
irrigation games. For instance, on a given ditch each agent may irrigate different quantities of 
land, which may not be sequentially ordered, may have different seniority of water rights, or may 
use the water for different purposes. Moreover, ditches have different geographic locations, 
which may lead to variation in rainfall, erosion, land value, etc. All such details are potentially 
relevant in determining the cost allocation adopted on any given ditch. We shall define a 
detailed irrigation game to be a simple irrigation game paired with a profile of additional detail 
d. The central theme of this paper is to determine the manner and extent to which environmental 
details are capable of explaining the cost-allocation rule that is employed. 
Detailed irrigation games offer new variations of cost-sharing rules, even for the specific 
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examples of average and serial cost sharing rules. First, consider the average rule. Total costs 
might be distributed equally across each agent (as we have defined above), equally across each 
acre irrigated (so each agent pays a fixed price per acre), or equally across shares of stock owned 
in the ditch's controlling interest (so each agent pays a fixed price per unit of stock owned). The 
serial variants, on the other hand, divide costs equally across all acres requiring a given segment 
for irrigation on either a per capita, per acre, or per share of owned stock basis. Despite the wide 
array of possibilities, our survey data indicate that the vast majority of ditches employ a cost 
allocation rule that falls into one of these two general classes (each containing a substantial 
portion of our sample): 
average class: total costs are distributed equally per capita, per acre, or per shares of 
stock owned. 
serial class: total costs are either distributed serially per capita, per acre, or per shares of 
stock owned; or agents pay only for costs incurred on their property (recall the marginal 
rule is also classified as "serial" as it too protects agents from the demands of 
downstream users). 
Before turning to our empirical analysis, it is interesting to note that while cost sharing 
sometimes creates tension between irrigators, there is often great clarity of thought involved in 
the selection of a cost share rule. Consider, for instance, the following discussion provided by 
one of our survey respondents, outlining serial cost sharing and its advantages as implemented 
on the respondent's ditch. 
There are five shares with four people holding the shares. If a problem occurs at the head 
of the ditch, everyone pays the amount that their share would dictate. If the problem 
extends beyond the headgate of the first owner, the other four shareholders pay their 
share which of course would be the four shares. If the problem extends beyond the 
second headgate or shareholder, the other three shareholders take care of it and so on. 
This keeps ownership within the confines of his rightful share and the shareholder really 
doesn't have a say in what happens below his headgate .... The owner at the end of the 
ditch has a fairly long area to take care of so ifhe wants to put money in it in cleaning or 
repairs, he can without having everyone agree to pay etc. so he does have some freedom 
in his own management. The cost is divided equally among the shareholders so everyone 
pays their share according to the way described above. No.4 shareholder has two shares 
because of the acreage so he has two shares to pay for where the others have one share to 
pay. The cost at the head of the ditch would be divided by 5 shares to headgate No.1, and 
the cost at headgate No.2 and below would be divided by 4 shares and so on. 
3. Survey and Other Data 
In this section, we describe the cost -sharing surveys, introduce the data from sources other 
than the survey, and define the variables to be used in the econometric analysis. 
3.1 Cost-Sharing Surveys 
We begin by noting that the irrigation ditches in our sample are typically small ditches 
(average of nine users) with an informal and unrecorded agreement on how costs will be shared. 
As a result, it was necessary to survey the irrigators to identify the cost-sharing rule employed on 
each ditch. We accomplished this through a sequence of two mail surveys. The first survey 
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presented the irrigators with the following options and asked them to identify the method of cost 
sharing that best describes the one used on their ditch: 
1. All users pay equal amounts to cover total ditch maintenance costs. 
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2. All users on or below a maintenance project pay equal amounts to cover total project costs. 
3. Each user pays only the cost of maintaining the portion of the main ditch located on their 
property. 
We also presented respondents with per acre and per share-of-owned-stock variants to 
options 1 and 2. However, we choose to focus solely on the distinction between the average and 
serial class of rules, rather than on all their possible variants, because our data are insufficient to 
accurately distinguish between all possible variations of the average and serial mechanisms. We 
also included the option to "write in" other cost sharing rules. Even though the open-ended 
option allowed respondents to report rules that do not conform to either the average or serial 
classifications, all responses fit into one of these two classes. 
Following up on the first survey, we sent out a postcard survey to the same set of irrigators 
asking them to either validate their responses to the initial surveyor, if they had failed to respond 
to the first survey, provide information for the first time. The postcard survey expanded the cost-
sharing questions slightly to ensure that the distinction between the average and serial rules was 
transparent: 
1. Is it customary for each user of your ditch to help pay for maintenance proj ects on the 
main ditch, even if these projects are located downstream from them? 
2. Ifmaintenance costs are to be shared by some group of users on the main ditch, 
how are these costs distributed? (Check whichever fits most closely.) 
_ Everyone in the group pay equal amounts. 
_ Costs are never shared, everyone pays only for costs on their own land. 
When combining the two surveys, we received a total of 270 usable responses on 98 ditches. 
To put this into perspective, there are a total of 169 irrigation ditches in Carbon and Stillwater 
Counties. Furthermore, four ditches in our sample and 10 ditches outside our sample are listed 
as "single-user" ditches in the MT state records. We, therefore, have in our sample the majority 
(94 of 155) of the state-listed, multi-user ditches in the two counties. 
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For both surveys, we generated our mailing list using water-rights information from the 
Water Resource Division of the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation 
(DNRC) (http://www.dnrc.state.mt.us/wrdlhome.htm). All irrigators are required by state law to 
file a water right, granting them a legal right to a specified amount of water. As part of the filing 
process, irrigators provide their names, mailing addresses, ditch name, and other specifics 
regarding their irrigation environment. We mailed the first survey to every irrigator holding a 
water right in Stillwater and Carbon Counties. 
In some instances, respondents from the same ditch issued conflicting reports regarding their 
cost-sharing rule. We offer two possible explanations for this apparent inconsistency (certainly 
others exist as well). First, it could be that the irrigators genuinely disagree about the cost-
sharing agreement (recall that the rules are not typically recorded in written form). Second, it 
could be that the location of the irrigators along the ditch influences their perception of the cost-
sharing rule. Indeed, maintenance and improvement proj ects often occur on an irregular basis 
and irrigators at the head of the ditch (front-enders) may actually be unaware of costs incurred at 
the ditch's tail. Should this be the case, front-enders may perceive serial cost sharing as 
indistinguishable from the average rule, while a tail-ender would not share this misperception. 
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Apparent inconsistencies in the stated cost-sharing rule are resolved through the following 
procedure: 
(1) assign to each ditch the rule stated by the majority of its respondents 
(2) break ties in (1) by assigning the ditch's majority response from the more detailed 
postcard survey 
(3) break ties in (2) by assigning the most common rule in the entire sample. 
There were 18 ditches reporting some sort of inconsistency in the stated cost-sharing rule, of 
which, 14, 2, and 2 were settled using criteria (1), (2) and (3), respectively. 
3.2 Other Data 
The remaining data include physical attributes of the irrigation environment and information 
from the irrigators' water-rights profile. We organize this section by the source of the data. 
The majority of our data were made available through the Water Resource Division of the 
Montana DNRC. From the DNRC, we obtained water-rights information for every irrigated 
field in Carbon and Stillwater Counties. This produced approximately 2,840 individual parcels 
of irrigated land (covering approximately 150,000 acres) in our sample and approximately 900 
irrigated parcels outside our sample. Each water-rights claim contains the owner's name and 
address, the name of irrigation ditch and its point of diversion, the purpose of water right and its 
date of priority, and the location and size of each parcel of land irrigated with the water right. 
The owner's name, address, and ditch name were used to initiate the mail surveys (as discussed 
above) and to identify each irrigator with a single ditch. 3 The purpose of the water right is 
almost always listed as irrigation, although a small percentage is listed as stock water, domestic 
3Many irrigators owned water rights on multiple ditches. In our survey, we asked that they choose the multi-
user ditch with the smallest number of users. 
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use, or lawn/garden use. The point of diversion refers to the place where the irrigation ditch is 
diverted from its primary source (see Figure 1.1). The priority date is an important date for 
irrigators. It determines how water is to be allocated among irrigators sharing the resource and is 
a legally binding in case of disputes over water allocation. The following is an excerpt from the 
Montana DNRC regarding water rights: 
Water rights in Montana are guided by the prior appropriation doctrine, that is, first in 
time is first in right. A person's right to use a specific quantity of water depends on 
when the use of water began. The first person to use water from a source established the 
first right, the second person could establish a right to the water that was left, and so on. 
During dry years, the person with the first right has the first chance to use the available 
water to fulfill their right. The holder of the second right has the next chance. 
Our survey respondents did indicate, however, that there is generally ample water for all users to 
irrigate their fields so that cost allocation (rather than water allocation) is their central concern. 
The point of diversion and location of each field were recorded by county, range, township, 
section and quarter section. To aid in recovering other physical data (discussed below), we 
translated the township data into latitude and longitude coordinates using the TRS2LL program 
provided by Martin Welfald (http://www.geocities.com/jeremiahobrien/trs2Il.html). The 
TRS2LL program recognizes location down to the section level. 
The second source of data is the GRAPHICAL LOCATOR, a program developed by Daniel 
Gustafson, a research scientist with the Department of Biology at the University of Montana-
Bozeman (http://www.esg.montana.edulgl/cst/index.html). The GRAPHICAL LOCATOR 
accepts longitude/latitude data as input and can be used to calculate "local roughness" for each 
irrigated field and the point of diversion. (Local roughness is discussed in more detail in the 
following section.) 
The third data source is the pair of Soil Surveys for Carbon and Stillwater Counties, 
published by the United States Department of Agriculture in cooperation with the Montana 
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Agricultural Experiment Station. These surveys represent a detailed study and mapping of the 
chemical, physical, and environmental characteristics of soils present throughout these counties. 
We focus attention upon those characteristics that affect the benefits or costs derived from 
irrigation, and thus seem most likely to influence the cost-sharing procedure agents choose to 
adopt. (A discussion of the specific variables considered is found in the following section.) 
The fourth source of data is a set of spatial climate maps generated by researchers at the 
Oregon Climate Service (OCS). These are the most detailed, highest-quality spatial climate data 
sets currently available (http://www.ocs.orst.edu/). OCS used the PRISM model to generate 
mean monthly precipitation estimates for the time period 1961-1990 (Daly et al. 1994; Daly et al. 
1997). The data are measured in millimeters of rainfall per month and are reported in a spatial 
grid, where the reported values are an average across each cell. Each cell spans approximately 
0.04167 latitudinal and longitudinal units (approximately 2 sections or 0.5 miles). 
The fifth and final source of data is the office of the Secretary of State for Montana. For 
some of the ditches, the irrigators came together and filed articles of incorporation, making the 
ditch a formal company. Using information from the Water Resource Surveys for Carbon and 
Stillwater Counties (State Water Conservation Board, 1946 and 1966) and the Secretary of 
State's office, we were able to identify which ditches had filed articles of incorporation. 
3.3 Variable Definitions 
In this section, we define and provide motivation for the variables to be used in the 
econometric analysis. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these variables over the 94 
multiple-user ditches used in our sample. Our dependent variable, AVERAGE CLASS, is a 
ditch-level binary variable set equal to one for an average and zero for a serial cost-sharing 
classification. As Table 1 indicates, our sample is moderately unbalanced in the sense that the 
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majority (71 %) of the ditches in our sample use cost-sharing rules within the average 
classification. 
The explanatory variables of our econometric model are chosen to offer proxies for the 
following types of information: (1) the (absolute and relative) benefits derived from irrigating a 
specific parcel of land, (2) the (absolute and relative) costs incurred from maintaining a specific 
ditch, and (3) the (current and historical) distribution of agents along the ditch. Benefit and cost 
information are suggestive of the stakes involved in being a member of a given irrigation ditch, 
and as such, may indicate the compromises that agents may be willing to make. Distributional 
information presents insight as to what agents may collectively perceive as fair cost sharing, as 
well as what the majority would prefer in their own self-interest. Let us now tum to the specific 
variables we use to elicit benefit, cost, and distributional information. 
First, TOWN is defined as the fraction of irrigators on a given irrigation ditch that have at 
least one field within a one mile radius of the center of a town.4 Only 27 of the 94 ditches had 
any irrigators located within a one-mile radius of a town, and of those 27 ditches, the average 
value for TOWN was approximately 0.38. The presence of users within and near towns is likely 
to produce a disparity in the benefits associated with the irrigation water. Users within a town 
generally use the water to irrigate their lawns or gardens while users outside town generally use 
the water to irrigate their fields, which produce hay and crops often crucial to their financial 
livelihood. Furthermore, users near town may be irrigating land with a higher market value 
relative to those further away from towns and the extent of this disparity (real or perceived) may 
influence what cost-sharing rule is deemed to be fair. 
4For Carbon and Stillwater Counties, the towns under consideration are Absarokee, Bridger, Columbus, 
Fromberg, Joliet, Red Lodge, and Roberts. 
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Second, ALTERNATIVE USE is defined as the fraction of users on a given irrigation ditch 
that either use the water from the main ditch for something other than irrigation (i.e., stock water, 
domestic use, etc.) or irrigate a field of less than half an acre. We choose half an acre because 
our own experience leads us to believe that fields less than half an acre are likely to be used for 
nontraditional purposes. Only 10 of the 94 ditches had non-zero values for ALTERNATIVE 
USE and of those la, the average value was approximately 0.18. We expect that TOWN and 
ALTERNATIVE USE may be related to the choice of cost-sharing rule because they represent 
possible differences in benefits derived from irrigation. For instance, if ranchers irrigating a crop 
benefit more per unit of water used than do users that simply irrigate their lawns, then 
interpersonal utility comparisons are much less transparent. Although we are a priori unsure 
whether greater variation in use will push agents toward an average or serial class of rules, it 
seems plausible that it may nonetheless be influential. 
Third, RAINFALL measures the total rainfall received during the growing months of May, 
June, July, and August. The more rainfall fields receive, the less beneficial is the irrigation water 
on the margin. As such, there may be less pressure for irrigators to fully cooperate in sharing the 
costs along all segments of the main ditch and thus push them toward the serial rule. 
RAINF ALL is averaged over all fields on the ditch on a per-acre basis. That is, RAINFALL is 
the weighted sum of the rainfall for each field}, with the weights equal to the ratio of irrigated 
acres for field} relative to the total number of irrigated acres on the ditch. There is substantial 
variation in rainfall across the ditches in our sample, varying from a minimum of 116 millimeters 
to a maximum of 244 millimeters per growing season. 
Fourth, ROUGHNESS is defined as the standard deviation of surrounding elevation values. 
This calculation uses the nearest 16 elevation values in the original I-degree (3 arc second) 
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digital elevation model data, which corresponds to a radius of about 125 meters (Gustafson 
2000). Each field is assigned a roughness value and then we take an acre-weighted average of 
these values across the entire ditch to form ROUGHNESS. Higher ROUGHNESS values have 
two important implications. First, higher values for ROUGHNESS imply ditches associated with 
a more contoured surface area, for which it is typically more difficult to effectively irrigate. 
Therefore, we would expect less benefit from irrigation, all else equal. Second, irrigation ditches 
located on steeper terrain generally are associated with higher construction and maintenance 
costs due to greater erosion of ditch banks. 
Fifth, RUNOFF is a measure of the propensity of the soil to absorb water. Higher values for 
RUNOFF imply soil types that absorb less water (i.e., have more runoff), and as a result, are not 
as well suited for irrigation. This also may imply higher costs due to greater erosion of ditch 
banks. Higher costs associated with higher values of RUNOFF (and ROUGHNESS) may imply 
increased pressure for irrigators to fully cooperate by sharing costs along all ditch segments. 
Sixth, NUMBER OF USERS is simply the number of irrigators distributed on a ditch. Some 
of the irrigation ditches filed for a single water right as an incorporated entity. For these ditches, 
it was not possible to directly identify the number of users, but only the number of irrigated 
fields. Therefore, to calculate the number of users, we used the average number of fields per 
irrigator for the remaining ditches in the sample (approximately 3.5 fields per user) to impute the 
number of users on the incorporated ditches. The number of users varies widely from only two 
users up to 61 users, with the "typical" ditch having approximately nine users. We anticipate 
that, all else equal, the more users there are on a ditch, the more likely it is that the rule will be 
average because the implied higher costs may necessitate a need to fully cooperate in sharing the 
costs. Furthermore, the prescribed average cost allocations are more transparent and typically 
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easier to calculate than serial allocations, a difference that is generally magnified as the number 
of users increases. 
Seventh, SOURCE DISTANCE is the distance between the point of diversion and the first 
private ditch branching off the main irrigation ditch.5 Ditches with large SOURCE DISTANCES 
were likely to have experienced large initial costs simply to get the water to the first user. In 
order to overcome this large initial expense, a critical number of users may be necessary to share 
the costs and therefore it is probably less likely that the ditch would develop piecewise (i.e., 
adding ranchers incrementally to the tail end of the ditch). To the extent that a more piecewise 
development is more likely to adopt a serial rule to accommodate new tail-end users, we would 
expect ditches with large SOURCE DISTANCES, all else equal, to be associated with average 
rules. Furthermore, this portion of the main ditch involves resources used by every irrigator on 
the main ditch. Therefore, the longer this segment is relative to the length of the entire ditch, the 
more average and serial allocations will tend to resemble one another (assuming costs are 
proportional to length and for a given number of agents). As a result, we expect that ditches with 
larger SOURCE DISTANCES will experience pressure to cooperate fully in sharing costs and 
thus be more likely to employ an average rule. As shown in Table 1, the average SOURCE 
DISTANCE is substantial; slightly less than one mile long. 
Eighth, TAIL DIFFERENTIAL measures the distance between the last field on the "original" 
ditch and the last field on the "current" ditch relative to the number of current users. (Hereafter, 
original and current refer to the ditch as it stood near the date of the first filed water right and the 
SIn actuality, our dataset provides field locations rather than the locations where private ditches branch off the 
main irrigation ditches. We estimate SOURCE DISTANCE by assuming that segment 1 of the main irrigation ditch 
is approximately linear and that the first private ditch is: perpendicular to the main ditch, leads to the center of the 
first field, and is 114 mile in length (our results are robust to variations in this length). The Pythagorean Theorem is 
then applied to calculate SOURCE DISTANCE. (Inspection of the maps from the Carbon and Stillwater Water 
Resource Surveys suggest the linearity assumption is reasonable for all ditches except Gruell and Weast. For those 
two ditches we calculate SOURCE DISTANCE by summing the lengths of approximately linear subsegments). 
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date in which the survey was administered, respectively).6 Again assuming that costs are 
proportional to distance, TAIL DIFFERENTIAL captures the incremental per capita costs 
associated with adding new users to the tail of the ditch. The larger is this value, the stronger the 
tendency may be for the original users to push for adoption of a serial rule as it approximates the 
increased cost shares the average rule would present to original users as compared to the serial 
rule. In this sense, TAIL DIFFERENTIAL also represents the degree to which original users 
may feel the need to be protected from demands imposed on the system by new users at the tail 
of the ditch. 
Ninth, ORIGINAL CENTER OF GRA VITY (CoGo) characterizes the manner in which the 
irrigated acres are distributed along the original ditch. The CoGo variable for the /h ditch is 
calculated as follows 
~ (~ .. - mined. .) acre· .) I, J . I, J I,J 
O . I CoGj = 1-1 m j 
(-ax(d .. )-min(d . . ) '"' acre·· ~. ~ . ~ ~ ~ 
I I i=i 
where diJ is the linear distance from the headgate to the ith private point of diversion, acreiJ is the 
number of irrigated acres associated with the ith private point of diversion, and mj is the total 
number of fields. Since the differences in the numerator and denominator both involve min ( diJ), 
this measure "nets out" the SOURCE DISTANCE. CoGo is bounded between zero and one, with 
values near zero indicating ditches with a higher relative concentration of irrigated acres to the 
left of center (i.e., toward the top of the ditch) and vice versa. In theory, this measure could be 
6More precisely, the original ditch is given by the ditch as it stood within the three-month window after the fIrst 
fIled water right, except for incorporated ditches which are treated as having been created at the time of 
incorporation. In calculating this window, we ignore the winter months of December, January and February because 
it is seems unlikely that any ditch construction could take place during that time frame. We choose a three-month 
window based on the presumption that the individuals who originally share ditch resources may not all fIle their 
water right on the same date. Varying the length of this window up to one year does not qualitatively affect our 
results. 
either negatively or positively correlated with AVERAGE CLASS. One might expect that a 
sense of fairness would drive irrigators with tail-heavy ditches (i.e., CoGo large) to choose a 
serial rule so that front-enders are not overly burdened by sharing costs from resources they do 
not use. However, it may also be that for tail-heavy ditches, tail-enders vote out of self-interest 
for the average rule in order to reduce their prescribed share of total costs. 
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Tenth, CoG DIFFERENTIAL is defined as the CURRENT CENTER OF GRAVITY (CoG1) 
less CoGo. CoG1 is identical to CoGo except that it pertains to the current profile of ditch users, 
rather than the original profile. Holding constant CoGo, an increase in CoG DIFFERENTIAL 
implies a shift over time in the distribution of users toward the tail of the ditch. We anticipate 
that its direction of correlation with AVERAGE CLASS to be the same as that for CoGo. 
4. Econometric Analysis 
In this section, we introduce the econometric model and the estimation methods. The 
primary goal of this section is to build an empirical model of the cost-sharing environment that is 
capable of explaining the choice of cost-sharing rule. 
4.1 Econometric Model 
We begin by assigning the unit of observation to be the irrigation ditch, which is indexed 
from i = 1, ... ,no We assume that the irrigators on each ditch are restricted to choose from the two 
classes of cost-sharing rules; average or serial. The choice of rule is in tum assumed to depend 
on structural characteristics as indicated by the following equation: 
where Yj is a latent variable measuring the likelihood of choosing either the serial or average 
cost-sharing class of rule for ditch i, Xi is a row vector of explanatory variables for ditch i 
(1) 
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thought to influence the choice of rule, P is a column vector of coefficients, and Ei is a normally 
distributed error term. By assuming a normal distribution, we then form the likelihood function 
conditional on the observed data. Letting <l> indicate the mean-zero normal cumulative density 
function, we can write the probability that the ith ditch chooses a rule from the average class 
(indicated by COj = 1) as: 
Since there are only two classes of cost-sharing rule, the probability that the ith ditch chooses the 
serial rule (COi = 0) is given by 1 - Pi = <l>(-XiP). Then assuming independence of error terms, we 
can write the (log) likelihood function as 
n 
In( L ) = L (co i In(~) + (1- co ) In(1- ~)). 
i=l 
The problem of forming and maximizing the (log) likelihood function by choosing p, given 
normally distributed error terms, is referred to as the probit model. This procedure results in an 
estimation problem requiring nonlinear optimization techniques to generate estimates of the P 
parameters and the associated marginal effects (see Greene 2000).7 
4.2 Discussion of the Results 
The estimation results from the probit model described above are presented in Table 2. The 
estimated coefficients are nearly all statistically significant (at standard significance levels) and 
the signs are generally in agreement with our expectations. Moreover, the overall fit of the 
model is excellent. As shown in Table 2, the likelihood ratio statistic testing whether all the 
variables are jointly able to explain variation in the dependent variable equals 72.6 with a 5% 
7The estimation was carried out in Gauss 3.5 using the Constrained Maximum Likelihood (CML) module and 
Newton's method for the nonlinear optimization. 
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critical chi-square value of 18.3. Furthermore, Table 3, which reports the number of correct and 
incorrect predictions, shows that we are able to correctly predict 64 of the 67 average rules and 
23 of the 27 serial rules, for nearly a 930/0 overall correct prediction percentage. It is particularly 
impressive that the model is able to correctly predict 85% of the serial rules, given the 
unbalanced nature of the dependent variable. As Greene (2000) points out, in order for the 
model to predict the less common category, it " ... may require an extreme configuration of the 
regressors."g In sum, using a relatively parsimonious model based solely on physical attributes 
of the irrigation environment, we are able to accurately predict which cost-sharing rule irrigators 
will collectively agree to use. 
Turning now to the individual estimated coefficients in Table 2, we find that all the 
coefficients other than the constant and ROUGHNESS are statistically significant at standard 
levels. Note the missing P-value and marginal effect for the ALTERNATIVE USE variable. 
Since every ditch with a non-zero value for ALTERNATIVE USE also employs an average rule, 
the coefficient is not identified and any arbitrarily large value for the coefficient will guarantee 
that the model always correctly associates the ALTERNATIVE USE ditches with the average 
rule. Therefore, although we omit the P-value and marginal effect for the ALTERNATIVE USE 
variable, it is important to recognize that it provides a substantial source of explanatory power. 
The signs on the coefficients also generally conform to our expectations. Higher values for all 
the variables except RAINFALL and TAIL DIFFERENTIAL imply greater likelihood of 
observing the average rule. 
8We also investigated the performance of the semi-parametric maximum score (MS) estimator. The MS 
estimator chooses the coefficients (P) to directly maximize the number of correct predictions. Using the MS 
estimator, we correctly predict only one more cost-sharing rule (88 of 94) than the probit model. Therefore, 
although the probit model does not directly maximize any traditional goodness-of-fit measure, it appears to fit the 
data nearly as well as a semi-parametric estimator that does. 
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It is also interesting to note the magnitude of a change in the explanatory variables on the 
probability of choosing a particular cost-sharing rule. The marginal effects in column three of 
Table 2 measure the change in probability of choosing the average rule for an incremental 
change in each variable (evaluated at the means). Several marginal effects stand out as 
noteworthy. First, while holding all other variables constant at their means, adding an additional 
user (increase from 9 to 10 users at the mean) increases the probability of choosing an average 
rule by 0.9 percentage points. Second, increasing SOURCE DISTANCE from approximately 
one to two miles, all else equal, increases the probability of choosing an average rule by 20.6 
percentage points. Third, adding one mile to the tail of the ditch (i.e., increase TAIL 
DIFFERENTIAL from approximately 0.10 to 0.21 at the average number of current users) 
increases the likelihood of choosing the serial rule by approximately 4.0 percentage points, all 
else equal. Fourth and finally, increasing the original center of gravity from 0.5 to 0.6 (i.e., 
moving the center of gravity of irrigated acres toward the tail of the ditch) increases the 
likelihood of choosing the average rule by 4.4 percentage points, while a similar increase in the 
current center of gravity, for a fixed original center of gravity, increases the likelihood of 
choosing the average rule by 6.4 percentage points. Thus, our data support the conjecture that an 
increase in either CoGo or CoG DIFFERENTIAL tends to increase the likelihood of observing a 
rule within the average class as tail-end irrigators vote out of self-interest for an average 
mechanism to reduce their prescribed cost shares. 
5. Conclusion 
At the outset, we posed the question of whether the choice of cost-sharing mechanisms is 
arbitrary or systematically related to the physical environment of the agents involved in sharing 
costs. Our results, using data from a sample of irrigators in south central Montana, indicate that 
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the chosen cost-sharing rules are far from arbitrary. In fact, detailed information on the variation 
in (relative and absolute) benefits and costs associated with irrigation, as well as the distribution 
of agents along an irrigation ditch, display impressive explanatory power in determining whether 
agents on a particular ditch will choose a rule from either the average or serial class of cost-
sharing mechanisms. Moreover, our survey indicates that the majority of these rules are quite 
stable, in the sense that the rules have typically remained unchanged through the better part of 
the previous century. This suggests that agents collectively (though not necessarily individually) 
consider the prescribed cost shares from the rules to be reasonably equitable. 
Our results are also supportive of the spirit underlying axioms appealed to in the theoretical 
cost-sharing literature. Indeed, one of the fundamental principles of serial cost sharing is the 
protection of those placing small demands on a shared facility from the burdens imposed by 
those with large demands. (See, for instance, Moulin and Shenker 1992 or Kolpin 1998.) We 
find that when there is greater pressure for "fully cooperative" efforts, an outcome in the average 
class becomes more likely. Conversely, when cooperative pressure is reduced, or in the extreme, 
when there is a mounting tension from the introduction of "high demand" agents (those at the tail 
of the ditch), it follows an outcome in the serial class becomes the more likely result. 
Furthermore, our empirical results appear to be robust. We considered alternative 
specifications by incorporating other theoretically reasonable explanatory variables such as the 
yield ratio between irrigated and non-irrigated land, ditch length, maximum ditch flow, total 
number of irrigated acres, variation in irrigated acres across users on a given ditch, gradient of 
the land, propensity for soil erosion, elevation, and a measure of cost savings to front-enders 
caused by the addition of new tail-enders. In addition to experimenting with other explanatory 
variables, we also examined (1) other tie-breaking rules for the few cases where irrigators 
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appeared to disagree about the existing cost-sharing rule; (2) a model allowing the irrigator, as 
opposed to the ditch, to be the unit of observation (allowing us to directly incorporate 
information on differing perceptions of the cost-sharing agreement); and (3) the possibility that 
the cost-sharing rules may display some degree of spatial clustering. Our overall conclusion is 
that our empirical results are not an anomaly, but rather representative of a stable relationship 
between the physical irrigation environment and the chosen cost-sharing rule. 
Finally, we note that the results from this study may be useful in determining equitable and 
stable resource allocation mechanisms in other applications. Examples may include allocating 
resources across academic units at a university, sharing the costs stemming from increasing 
electrical output to a regional power grid, or determining a protocol for sharing costs associated 
with reducing the production of green house gases. While the structural parameters of such 
settings are quite different from those examined here, many of the same tensions and pressures 
between the partners of a cooperative venture remain. 
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Table 1. Descri,Etive Statistics 
Statistics 
Variable Standard Sample Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Size 
Average Class 0.713 0.455 0.000 1.000 94 
Town 0.382 0.336 0.033 1.000 27 
Alternative Use 0.181 0.146 0.040 0.500 10 
Rainfall 198.791 25.460 116.306 243.946 94 
Roughness 3.777 3.246 0.000 18.716 94 
Runoff 1.408 0.451 0.000 2.333 94 
Number of Users 8.848 10.416 2.000 61.417 94 
Source Distance 0.998 1.045 0.000 5.403 94 
Tail Differential 0.101 0.211 0.000 1.342 94 
Original CoG 0.497 0.144 0.140 0.859 94 
Current CoG 0.514 0.125 0.192 0.859 94 
Notes: For the Town and Alternative Use variables, the reduced sample size reflects 
only ditches with positive values for the variables. The Number of Users variable 
has a non-integer maximum because the number of users was not listed in the state 
records. Therefore, we imputed the number of users for the incorporated ditches 
using the sample ratio of fields per user for unincorporated ditches (the number of 
fields was available for incorporated ditches). 
Table 2. Probit Estimates (Average Rule = 1, Serial Rule = 0) 
Statistics 
Variable 
Coefficient Estimate P Value Marginal Effect 
Constant -2.570 0.248 
Town 5.419** 0.037 0.376 
Alternative Use 86.355 
Rainfall -0.025* 0.061 -0.002 
Roughness 0.076 0.137 0.005 
Runoff 1.421 ** 0.023 0.099 
Number of Users 0.125** 0.031 0.009 
Source Distance 2.971 *** 0.000 0.206 
Tail Differential -5.259*** 0.001 -0.365 
Original CoG 6.301 ** 0.012 0.437 
CoG Differential 9.156*** 0.002 0.636 
Sample Size 94 
Likelihood Ratio 72.627 Statistic 
McFadden's 0.644 Pseudo R2 
Notes: The marginal effects are evaluated at the mean. (*), (**), and (***) indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % level, respectively. The Alternative Use coefficient is 
not identified as every ditch with positive values for the variable employ the average rule. 
In this sense, it is a perfect predictor of the cost-sharing rule and any arbitrarily large 
coefficient would generate the same goodness-of-fit. 
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Table 3. Number of Correct and Incorrect Predictions 
Actual 
Totals 
Average Serial 
Predicted Average 64 4 68 
Serial 3 23 26 
Totals 67 27 94 
Notes. 64 of the 67 average rules (96%) and 23 of the 27 serial rules (85%) were 
predicted correctly. Overall, 87 of the 94 rules (93%) were predicted correctly. 
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